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Forensic Science:
Seizing Evidence From Suspects for
. Forensic Analysis
Paul C. Giannelli*

. As the O.J. Simpson case illus
trates, trace evidence can be used to
establish a link between a suspect and
a crime scene. Blood, semen, hair,
fibers, soil, and fmgerprints have all
been used in this manner.In addition,
bite marks, gunshot residues, hand
writing, and voice exemplars have
been used to connect a suspect and a
crime.In some cases, procedures as
invasive as the surgical removal of
bullets from suspects has occurred.
Moreover, the advent of DNA profil
ing and DNA data banks foreshadow
an increase in the use of scientific
evidence.
These techniques often require the
suspect's cooperation, ranging from
passive presence for fmgerprinting or
blood extraction to active participa
tion in providing voice or handwrit
ing samples. This contact between
the police and a suspect implicates
several constitutional rights: (1) the
privilege against self-incrimination;
(2) the right to counsel; (3) the right
to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures; and (4) due process.
This column examines these issues.

to the collection of physical evidence
is Schmerber v. Ca lifornia. 1 While
being treated at a hospital for injuries
sustained in an automobile collision,
Schmerber was arrested for driving
under the influence of alcohol.At the
direction of the investigating police
officer, a physician obtained a blood
sample from Schmerber. Before the
Supreme Court, Schmerber argued
that the extraction of blood violated
the privilege against self-incrimimi
tion. Rejecting this argument, the
Court held that the privilege covers
only communicative or testimonial
evidence, not physical or real evi'
dence.According to the Court:
It is clear that the protection of
the privilege reaches an accused's
communications, whatever form
they might take .... On the other
hand, both federal and state courts
have usually held that it offers no
protection against compulsion to
submit to fingerprinting, photo
graphing, or measurements, to
write or speak for identification,
to appear in court, to stand, to
assume a stance, to walk, or to
make a particular gesture.The dis
tinction which has emerged, often
expressed in different ways, is that
the privilege is a bar against com
pelling "communications" or
''testimony,'' but that compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused
the source of "real or physical
evidence" does not violate it.2

Self-In crimination
Testimonia l vs. Physical Evidence

The leading case on the applicabil
ity of the Fifth Amendment privilege
*Albert J. Weath erh ead Ill & Rich 
ard W. Weath erh ead Professor of Law,
Case Western Reserve Universit y. This
column is based in part on P. Giannelli
& E. Imwinkelried, Scientific Evidence
(2d ed. 1 99 3) . Reprint ed with permis
sion.
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384 U. S. 75 7 (1966) .
Id . at 763- 764 .
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Subsequent Supreme Court cases
reaffirmed the testimonial-physical
evidence distinction. In Gilbert v.
California, 3 the Court concluded that
the compelled production of a ''mere
handwriting exemplar, in contrast to
the content of what is written, like the
voice or body itself, is an identifying
physical characteristic outside [the
Fifth Amendment's] protection. "4
Similarly, in United States v. Dion is
io, 5 the Court ruled that compelling a
defendant to speak for the purpose of
voice analysis did not violate the Fifth
Amendment because the "voice re
cordings were to be used solely to .
measure the physical properties of
the witnesses' voices, not for the tes
timonial or communicative content of
what was to be said. "6
In its most recent case on the sub
ject, Penn sylvan ia v. Muniz/ the
Court once again applied the
Schmerber rule. Muniz was asked to
perform a horizontal gaze nystagmus
test, a "walk and turn" test, and a
"one leg stand test." A videotape of
his performance was shown at trial.
The Court wrote:

ld . at 592 .

Wh en asked if h e knew the d at e
of h is sixth birthd ay, Muniz responded:
''No,I don't. '' Id. at 58 6.
10 E. g.,In re SpecialFed. Grand Jury,
809 F.2d 1023 , 102 7- 1028 (3d Cir.
198 7) (requiring backh and slant exem
plars) ; United States v. Rich ard son, 755
F.2d 685, 685-686 (8th Cir. 198 5) .

388 u.s. 2 63 (1967).

11 E. g. , In re Doe, 860 F.2d 40, 46
(2d Cir. 1988) ; Unit ed States v. Tho
mann, 609 F.2d 560, 562 (1st Cir. 19 79) .

12 E. g., Burnett v. Collins, 982 F.2d

922 (5th Cir. 1993) Oive voice exemplar
in presence of jury) ; Fuller v. State, 8 58
S.W.2d 528 , 53 1- 532 (Tex. Ct. App.
1993) (t rial court ord er requiring d efen
d ant t o repeat word s used by assailant for
th e purpose of voice identificat ion d oes
not violate state const it ut ion) .

410 u.s. 1 (19 73).

6 ld. at 7. See also Unit ed Stat es v.
Wade, 388 U. S. 2 18 , 222 (196 7) (com
pelling an accused to exhibit his person
for observation was compulsion "to ex
h ibit h is physical ch aracteristics, not
compulsion to d isclose any knowled ge h e
might h ave") .
7

swer when requested to state the date
of his sixth birthday amounted to a
testimonial response and should have
been excluded.9
Under Schmerber, obtaining evi
dence for most forensic techniques is
free from Fifth Amendment concerns
because t..hese techniques involve
physical, not testimonial, eyidence.
Thus, the lower courts have applied
Schmerber to cases involving hand
writing, 10 fingerprints, 11 voice exem
plars, 12 dental impressions, 13 urine

9

4 Id. at 266-26 7. Accord United States
v. Euge, 444 U. S. 70 7, 718 (1980)
("Compulsion of h andwriting exemplars
. . . [not]test imonial evidence protect ed
by th eFifth Amendment privilege against
self incrimination") ; United States v.
Mara, 4 10 U. S. 19, 22 n. *(1973) (hand 
writ ing exemplars) .
5

In contrast, Muniz's inability to an

•

Under Schmerber and its progeny,
. . . any slurring of speech and
other evidence of lack of muscular
J

coordination revealed by Muniz's
responses to Officer Hosterman's
direct questions constitute nontes
timonial components of those re
sponses. Requiring a suspect to
reveal the physical manner in
which he articulates words, like
requiring him to reveal the physi
cal properties of the sound pro
duced by his voice, see Dionisio
. . ., does not, without more, com
pel him to provide a ''testimonial''
response for purposes of the privi
lege.8

13 E.g., United States v. Maceo, 8 73
F .2d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.) (exa.TTJi..rmtion of
t eeth) , cen. denied ,493 U. S. 840 (1989) .

496 U.S. 582 (1990) .
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while evidence is obtained does not
violate the self-incrimination clause
of the Georgia Constitution. Thus,
fmgerprints could be compelled.
However, compelled active partici
pation, such as requiring a suspect to
1
place a foot in a cast, is prohibited.2

samples, 14 gunshot residues, 15 and
other techniques.16
Nevertheless, the application of
the Schmerber rule continues to pro
voke disagreement in some situa
tions. For example, in State v.
Maze,17 the court ruled that "recita
tion of the alphabet is not testimonial
in that it does not require a suspect to
coinrnunicate any personal beliefs or
knowledge." 18 In contrast, in A llred

Refusal to Submit to Intoxication
Tests
In South Dakota v. Neville, 22 the
Supreme Court considered whether
the admission into evidence of a de
fendant's refusal to submit to a blood
alcohol test violated the Fifth Amend
ment. Instead of relying on the testi
monial-physical evidence distinction,
the Court rested its decision on differ
ent grounds. Accordmg to the Court,
refusal to take the test did not amount
to ''compulsion'' within the meaning
of the privilege: " [A] refusal to take
a blood-�cohol test, after a police
officer has lawfully requested it, is
not an act coerced by the officer, and
thus is not protected by the privilege
against self-incrimination. "23 The
Court explained that

v. State, 19 the Florida Supreme Court
ruled that evidence of the defendant's
incorrect recitation of the alphabet
when stopped for driving under the
influence violated the state constitu
tion: ''Failure to accurately recite the
alphabet 'discloses information' be
yond possible slurred speech; it is the
content (incorrect recitation) of the

speech that is being introduced, rath
er than merely the manner (slurring)
of speech.' '20
State Constitutions
As Allred indicates, an accused
may not have to rely on federal law. A
state is always free to provide greater
self-incrimination protection than is
afforded by the Fifth Amendment.
For example, passive submission

the respondent concedes, as he
must, that the State could legiti
mately compel the suspect, against
his will, to accede to the test. Giv
en, then, that the offer of taking a
blood-alcohol test is clearly legiti
mate, the action becomes no less
legitimate when the State offers a

14 E. g. , Murray v. Haldeman, 1 6 M.J.
74, 80-81 (C. M. A. 1983); McKenna v.
State, 671 S. W.2d 1 3 8 , 1 39 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) .
15 E. g. ,
State v. Ulrich , 609 P.2d
1 2 1 8 , 1222 (Mont. 1980) (gunsh ot resi
due swabbings) ; Commonwealth v. Mo
nah an, 549 A.2d 231 , 23 5 (Pa. Super.
1988) .

21 Creamer v. State, 192 S.E.2d 3 50
(Ga. 1 9 72) (surgical removal of bullet;
Georgia Constitution provides greater
self-incrimination protection th an U.S.
Constit ution) , cert. dismissed, 4 1 0 U.S.
975 (19 73); Green v. State, 398 S.E.2d
360, 362 (Ga. 1990) ("[T]lie use of a
substance naturally excreted by the hu
man bod y [urine] d oes not violate a defen
d ant's righ t against self-incrimination un
d er the Georgia Const itution. ") , cen.
denied, 500 U.S. 93 5 (199 1 ) .

16
E. g. , United States v. Dougall, 919
F.2d 932 , 935 (5th Cir. 1 990) (h air sam
ples) , cert. denied, 501 U. S. 1234
(1991 ) ; People v. Thomas, 22 5 Cal.
Rptr. 2 77, 2 79 (Cal. App. 1 986) (saliva,
h air, and blood) .
17
18
19

825 P.2d 1 169 (Kan. App. 1992).
Id. at 1 1 73 .
622 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1993) .

20 ld. at 987.
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4 59 u.s. 553 (1983).

23

Id . at 564.
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violated the state constitution: ''Kf
the fact that the defendant refused to
allow the hand-swabbing demon

second option of refusing the test,
with the attendant penalties for
making the choice. 24

strates consciousness of guilt, such
refusal rises to the level of a self

A number of courts have reached
the same result on state constitutional
grounds.25

The

Supreme

accusation.''27

Judicial

Polygraph Examinations

Court of Massachusetts, however,
has reached a different conclusion

Some types of forensic techniques,

under its constitution. That court has

however, .

written:

Fifth

the one hand, and co:rnmunications or

not testimonial, refusal evidence
falls in the same category.

testimony, on the other, is not readily

fu the

drawn in many cases.' '28 Polygraph

ordinary case a prosecutor would

testing is an example. 29 The Court in

seek to introduce refusal evidence

Schmerber commented on the Fifth

to show, and would argue if per

Amendment aspects of polygraph ex

mitted, that a defendant's refusal

aminations:

is the equivalent of his statement,

I have had so much to drink that
I !mow or at !east suspect that I am
unable to pass the test.
. . .

Some tests seemingly directed to
obtain ''physical evidence,'' for

''

example, lie detector tests measur

"

ing changes in body function dur

[I]f refusal evidence has rele

ing interrogation, may actually be
directed to eliciting responses

vance to any issue essential to the
prosecution's case, it is because

which are essentially testimonia!.
To compel a person to submit to

it is reflective of t.�e lmowledge,
understanding, and thought pro

iesting in which an effort will be
made to determine his guilt or in
nocence on the basis of physiologi

26

Consequently, evidence of refusal to

cal responses, whether willed or
not, is to evoke the spirit and histo

take a breathalyzer test violates the
state self-incrimination clause. In a

ry of the Fifth Amendment. 30

later case, the same court ruled that
evidence of a defendant's refusal to

Courts that have admitted polygraph
evidence have recognized the appli

submit to a gunshot residue test also
2'1

implicate

Court has noted, the ''distinction be
tween real or physical evidence, on

It does not logically follow, how
ever, that, because test results are

cess of the accused.

may

Amendment issues. As the Supreme

cability of the privilege in this con
text.31

Id. at 5 63.

25 E. g. , Cox v. People, 735 P . 2d 153,
157(Colo. 1987); McDonnell v. Comm'r
of Pub. Safety, 473 N. W. 2d 848, 855
(Minn. 1991); State v. Hoenscheid, 374
N. W. 2d 128, 129-130(S. D. 1985).

2
7 Commonwealth
v . Lydon, 597
N. E. 2d 36, 40 (Mass. 1992). See also
State v. Denney, 536 A. 2d 1242, 1245
(N. H. 1987) (admission of defendant' s
refusal without first warning him violates
state due process).

26 Opinion of the Justices to the Sen
ate, 591 N.E. 2d 1073, 1077-1078(Mass.
1992). The Massachusetts Constitution
contains an additional clause; it prohibits
compelling a person to ''furnish evidence
against himself. ' ' The Court has ruled
that this provision requires a ''broader
interpretation" than that of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 1078.

211
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S.
553, 561 (1983).
29

Id. at 561 n . 12.

30

384 U.S. at 764.

31 E.g., Commonwealth v. A Juve
nile, 313 N. E.2d 120, 127 (Mass. 1974)
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Right to Counsel

this basis. Sinlilarly, a person arrest
ed for driving while intoxicated does
not have a federal constitutional right
to counsel when deciding whether to
take a blood-alcohol test. 37 In some
jurisdictions, however, a right to
"consult" counsel may be guaran
teed by state law. 3 8

The Sixth Amendment guarantees
an accused the right to counsel. This
. nght has not been limited to trial
but has been extended, under some
circumstances, to identification pro
cedures32 and interrogations.33 Al
though defendants have argued that
the right to counsel also applies when
evidence is obtained from them for
'scientific analysis, this argument has
failed for two reasons.

Critical Stages
The right to counsel often does not
apply for a second reason. Neither the
obtaining of evidence for scientific
analysis nor the analysis itself is a
"critical" stage within the meaning
of the Sixth Amendment.
In United States v. Wade,39 the
Supreme Court held that the right to
counsel applied to lineup identifica
tions. According to the Court, a line
up presents ''grave potential for prej
udice . . . which may not be capable
of reconstruction at trial, and [the]
presence of counsel itself can often
avert prejudice and assure a meaning
ful confrontation at trial. "40 The
Court, however, distinguished eye
witness identification procedures
from the scientific analysis of physi
cal evidence:

Attachment ofRig ht
First, the Supreme Court has held
that the right to counsel attaches only
after the ''initiation of adversary judi
cial criminal proceedings-whether
by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information, or
arraignment.' '34 An arrest, by itself,
does not trigger the right to counsel.
Frequently, evidence that is sub
mitted for scientific analysis has been
obtained from defenda.ilts during the
investigatory stage, prior to com
mencement of formal criminal pro
ceedings, and thus before the time
when the right to counsel attaches.
Cases involving swabbing for gun
shot residues35 and the taking of teeth
impressions36 have been decided on

The Government characterizes the
lineup as a mere preparatory step
in the gathering of the prosecu
tion's evidence, not different-for

(''Th e polygraph results are essentially
testimonial in nature and therefore a d e
fendant could not be compelled initially
to take such an examination on th e Com
monwealth 's motion.'') .

bane) (teeth impressions taken before
righ t to counsel attach ed) , cert. denied,
499 u.s. 932 (1991) .

32 See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U. S. 682
(19 72) ; United States v. Wade, 388 U. S.
2 18 (1967) .

37 See State v: Cich owski, 523 A.2d
503 , 506 (Conn. 1987) ; Brank v. State,
528 A.2d 118 5, 1190 (Del. 198 7) (no due
process righ t to consult attorney) .

33 See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
3 8 7 (19 77) ; Massiah v. United States,
3 77 u.s. 201 (1964) .

38 E. g. , Whiseh unt v. State, 746 P.2d
1298, 1298 (Alaska 1987) (statutory
righ t) ; Friedman v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 , 832 (Minn.
199 1) (state constitution) ; State v. Gar
vey, 59 5 A.2d 267, 268 (Vt. 199 1) (statu
tory righ t) .

Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689
(1972) .
34

35 State v. Ulrich , 609 P.2d
12 18
(Mont. 1980) (gunsh ot residue swab
bings taken before righ t to counsel
attached) .
36 Spence v. State, 795 S. W.2d 743 ,
752 -753 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en

165
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388 U. S. 2 18 (1967).

40

Id. at 236 .

CRIMINAL LAW BULLETIN
nal proceedings entitling petitioner
to the assistance of counsel. . . .
[T]here is minimal risk that the
absence of counsel might derogate
from his right to a fair trial. . . .
If, for some reason, an unrepresen
tative exemplar is taken, this can
be brought out and corrected
through the advers�ry processat
trial since the accused can make
an unlimited number of additional
exemplars for analysis and com
parison by government and de
fense handwriting experts. Thus,
"the accused has the opportunity
for a meaningful confrontation of
the [State's] ca�e· at trial through
the ordinary processes of cross
examination of the [State's] expert
[handwriting] witnesses and the
presentation of the evidenc� of his
own [handwriting] experts. "43

Sixth Amendment purposes-from
various other preparatory steps,
such as systemized or scientific
analyzing of the accused's fmger
prints, blood sample, clothing,
hair, and the like. We think there
are differences which preclude
such stages being characterized as
critical stages at t,Vhicp t:he acc;:l!��d
has the right to the presence of his
counsel. Knowledge of the tech
niques of science and technology
is sufficiently available, and the
variables
in
techniques
few
enough, that the accused has the
opportunity for a meaningful con
frontation . of the Government's
case at trial through the ordinary
processes of cross-examination of
Government's expert witnesses
and the presentation of the evi
dence of his own experts. The de
nial of a right to have his counsel
present at such analyses does not
therefore violate the Sixth Amend
ment; they are not critical stages
since there is minimal risk that his
counsel's absence at such stages
might derogate from his right to a
fair trial. 41

Hence, unlike eyewitness identification procedures, the adversary pro
cess is thought to afford a criminal
defendant an adequate opportunity to
confront and challenge scientific evi
dence. Moreover, as one court has
remarked: "Not only is the taking of
the exemplars not at a critical stage
of the proceedings entitling an ac
cused to the assistance of counsel, but
Appellant has pointed to no function
counsel could perform, were he pres
ent, save the futile advice not to give
the sample.' '44
Accordingly, courts have held
the right to counsel does not apply
when gunshot residues,45 fmger-

In a companion case, Gilbert v.
California, 42 the defendant contended
that his right to counsel had been
violated when he was compelled to
provide handwriting exemplars in the
absence of an attorney. Whereas
Wade focused on the time of labora
tory analysis, Gilbert focused on the
time the evidence is obtained from
the suspect. Nevertheless, the result
was the same; the right to counsel did
not apply. The Court in Gilbert found
significant differences between con
ducting a lineup and obtaining exem
plars:

43 Id. at 267. Accord United States v.
Euge, 444 U. S. 70 7, 718 (1980) (h and
writing exemplars) ; United States v. Ash,
413 U. S. 300, 3 18 n.IO (19 73) (ph oto
graph ic id entifications) .
44 Lewis v . United States, 3 8 2 F.2d
8 17, 8 19 (D. C. Cir.) (h and writing exem
plars) , cen. denied, 389 U. S. 962 (1967) .

The taking of the exemplars was
not a "critical" stage of the crimi41

ld . at 22 7-228 .

42

388 u.s. 263 (196 7) .

45 E.g. , State v. Od om, 2 77 S.E.2d
3 52 , 3 55 (N. C.) , cen. denied, 4 54 U.S.
1052 (1981) ; P eople v. Mullings, 488
N.Y. S.2d 36,3 7 (A.D. 198 5) .

166

FORENSIC SCIENCE
prints,46 palmprints,47 blood,48 hair ,49
and other types of evidence50 are ob
tained from suspects. In a recent case,
the Washington Supreme Court noted
that 'the taking of nontestimonial
physical evidence [blood for DNA
testing] is not usually a critical stage
at which the right to counsel atta
ches. "51

In other situations, the evidence is

seized from a suspect. The cases in
volving the latter situation are dis
cussed here.
Typically, there are two distinct
Fourth Amendment issues raised

•

when physical evidence is obtained
from a suspect for the purpose of
scientific analysis. First, there is a
"seizure" of the person that brings
the suspect under the control of the
police. Second, there is a subsequent
search anc:!. seizure of physical charac
teristics , biological specimens, or
trace evidence from the seized
personY

Search and Seizure
. The Fourth Amendment guaran
te es the right to be free from unrea
sonable governmental searches and
seizures. In some cases, evidence that
may be subjected to scientific analysis
is seized from a specific location. 52

Seizure of the Person

E. g. , Ward v. United States, 486
F. 2d 305,306 ( 5th Cir. 1 9 73),cert. de
nied, 416 U. S. 990 (1974) ; United States
v. McNeal, 463 F.2d 1 1 80 , 1 1 81 ( 5th
Cir. 1972).
46

Before trace evidence or physical
characteristics can be obtained from
a suspect, the suspect must either
consent or be detained under some
form of government control. Such
control raises the question whether
the person has been "seized" within
the meaning of the Fourth Amend
ment. Evidence submitted for scien
tific analysis has been collected from
suspects (1) at the time of arrest;
(2) during pretrial incarceration; (3)
during detention on less than proba
ble cause; and (4) pursuant to grand
jury subpoenas and administrative

47 E. g. ,United States v. Sanders,4 77
F.2d 1 12 , 1 13 ( 5th Cir. ) , cert. denied,
414 U. S. 8 70 ( 1 9 73) ; State v. Jones,467
So. 2d 147,1 49- 1 50 (La. App. 1985) .
48

E. g. , Sch merber v. California,384

u.s. 757,76 5-766 (1966) .

49 E. g.,United States v. Jackson,448
F.2d 963 ,9 71 (9 th Cir. 1 9 71 ) ,cert. de
nied, 405 U. S. 924 ( 19 72); Henry v.
United States, 432 F.2d 1 14, 1 19 (9 th
Cir. 1970) , cert. denied, 400 U. S. 10 1 1
( 19 71).

summonses. If the initial seizure of
the person violates Fourth Amend
ment requirements, evidence from
the subsequent search of that person
may be excluded at trial as ''fruit of

5{) E. g., United States v. Maceo, 8 73
F.2d 1 , 4-5 ( 1 st Cir.) ( examination of
teeth) ,cen. denied, 493 U. S. 840 (1989) ;
United States v. Kim, 577 F.2d 4 73 ,
48 1 (9th Cir. 1 9 78) (voice id entification) ;
United States v. Love,482 F.2d 2 1 3 ,2 1 6
(5th Cir.) ( bomb nitrate swabbings) ,cen.
denied, 414 U. S. 1026 ( 1 9 73).

the poisonous tree."

51 State v. Kalakosky,8 52 P.2d 1064,
1069 (Wash . 1993).

5 3 As th e Court h as noted: "[T]h e ob
taining of physical evid ence from a per
son involves a potential Fourth Amend
ment violation at two different levels
th e 'seizure' of the 'person' necessary to
bring h im into contact with government
agents . . . and th e subsequent search for
and seizure of th e evid ence. " United
States v. Dionisio, 410 U. S. 1 ,8 ( 1 9 73)
( voice exemplar) .

52 E. g. , Cardwell v. Lewis,41 7 U. S.
583 (1974) ( seizure of suspect's car for
paint chip and tire mark comparison) ;
Coolidge v. New Hampsh ire,403 U. S.
443 ( 1 971) ( seiz ure of suspect's car to
search for evid ence such as h air and parti
cles th at were later analyz ed by neutron
activation analysis).
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cause may satisfy Fourth Amendment
requirements.The Terry standard has
come to be known as the ''reasonable
suspicion" test. The importance of
Terry and its progeny, defining the
scope of the "stop and frisk" doc
trine, to the collection of physical
evidence for the purpose of scientific
analysis turns on dictum in Davis v.
Mississippi. As noted preYiously, the
Court in Davis held the detention of
a suspect on less than probable cause,
during which fmgerprints were ob
tained, unconstitutional. However,
the Court commented:

A rrest
Generally, if the arrest is valid, the
seizure of physical evidence from the
person incident to the arrest is also
valid.While the arrest of a person in
a public place does not require the
issuance of an arrest warrant, 54 it does
require probable cause that a crime
has been committed by the arrestee.
For example, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of the initial seizure
(the arrest) before turning to the
Fourth Amendment implications of
withdrawing blood from Schmer
ber.55 The Court held that probable
cause for the arrest existed based on
the arresting officer's observation of
the defendant at both the scene of the
accident and at the hospital.
In Davis v. Mississippi,56 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a
detention during which fmgerprir1ts
were obtained from Davis.Although
fmgerprints were found on the win
dow used by an assailai1t to gain entry
into a rape victim's house, the victim
could not provide any description of
her attacker other than his race and
approximate age. The police con
ducted a dragnet procedure in which
numerous young blacks, including
Davis, were detained and fingerprint
ed. The Court ruled that the deten
tion, based neither on probable cause
nor a warrant, was illegal. Conse
quently, the fingerprint evidence was
suppressed.

Detentions for the sole purpose of
obtaining fmgerprints are no less
subject to the constraints of the
Fourth Amendment.It is arguable,
however, that, because of the
unique nature of the fmgerprinting
process, such detentions might,
under narrowly defined circum
stances, be found to comply with
the Fourth Amendment even
though there is no probable cause
in the traditional sense....Deten
tion for fmgerprinting may consti
tute a much less serious intrusion
upon personal security than other
types of police searches and deten
tions. Fingerprinting
involves
none of the probing into an individ
ual's private life and thoughts that
marks an interrogation or search.
Nor can fingerprint detention be
employed repeatedly to harass any
individual, since the police need
only one set of each person's
prints. Furthermore, fmgerprint
ing is an inherently more reliable
and effective crime solving tool
than eyewitness identifications or
confessions and is not subject to
such abuses as the improper lineup
and the ''third degree.'' Finally,
because there is no danger of de
struction of fingerprints, the limit
ed detention need not come unex
pectedly or at an inconvenient
time. For this same reason, the

Detention on Less Than Probable
Cause
�
In Terry v. Ohio,S7 the Supreme
Court first recognized that the deten
tion of a suspect on less than probable
54 United States v. Watson, 423 U. S.
41 1 (1 976).
55 Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S.
757, 768 -771 (1966).
56

394 U. S. 72 1(1 969) .

57

392 U.S. I (1968).
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2. Procurement of evidence of
identifying physical character
istics from an identified or par
ticularly described individual
may contribute to the identifica
tion of the individual who com
mitted such offense.
3. Such evidence cannot other
wise be obtained by the investi
gating officer from either the
law enforcement agency em
ploying the affiant or the crimi
nal identification division of the
Arizona department of public
safety.62

general requirement that the autho
rization of a judicial officer be ob
tained in advance of detention
would seem not to adrrri t of any
exception in the fmgerprinting
context.58
As a result of this dictum, a number
of statutes and court rules providing
for· de,_tention on less than probable
cause for the purpose of nontestimo
nial identification procedures have
been adopted59 or proposed.60 For ex
ample, an Arizona statute provides
for the issuance of judicial orders for
obtaining "fingerprints, palm prints,
footprints, measurements, handwrit
ing, handprinting, sound of voice,
blood samples, urine sampes, saliva
samples, hair samples, comparative
personal appearance, or photographs
of an individual.' '61 Such an order
may be issued if the following condi
tions are satisfied:

The Arizona courts have upheld the
constitutionality of this provision. 63
Similarly, the Colorado rule on non
testimonial identification procedures
also has been upheld.64
Unlike other provisions, the Ari
zona statute does not specify the
quantum of evidence required to sub
ject a person to such an order. In
contrast, an Idaho statute provides
that a nontestimonial identification
order may be issued if "[r]easonable
grounds exist, which may or may not
amount to probable cause, to believe
that the . . . individual committed the
criminal offense. "65

I

1. Reasonable cause for belief that
a specifically described crimi
nal offense punishable by at
least one year in the state prison
has been committed.
58 Davis, 394 U.S. at 727-728. The
Court then commented: "We have no
occasion in this case, however, to deter
mine whether the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment could be met by nar
rowly circumscribed procedures for ob
taining, during the course of a criminal
investigation, the fingerprints of individ
uals for whom there is no probable cause
to arrest.... " Id.at 728.

62 A
riz. Rev.Stat.Ann.§ 13-3905(A)
(1989).
63
See State v. Via, 704 P.2d 238
(Ariz.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.1048
(1986); State v. Grijalva, 533 P.2d 533
(Ariz.) (en bane) (photographs, finger
prints, and hair samples), cert. denied,
423 U.S.873 (1975).

59 E.g.
, Colo. R. Crim.P.41.1; Neb.
Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3301-29-3307 (1989);
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 15A-271-15A-282
(1991); Vt. R. Crim.P.41.1.

64 See People v. Davis, 669 P.
2d 130,
133-135 ( Colo. 1983) (nontestimonial
order for photographs, fingerprints, and
voice exemplar based on informant's tip
upheld); People v.Madson, 638 P.2d 18,
31-32 (Colo.1981) (en bane) (handwrit
ing exemplars).

60 Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure art. 170 (Proposed Official
Draft 1975); Unif. R. Crim.P.436 (Ap
proved Draft 1974); Fed. R. Crim. P.
41.1 (Proposed Draft), 52 F.R.D.462
(1971).

65 Idaho Code
§ 19-625(B) (1987).
See also Colo. R. Crim. P. 41.1(c)(2)
("reasonable grounds, not amounting to
probable cause to arrest, to suspect that
the person ...committed the offense").

61
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.§ 13-3905( D)
(1989).
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The U.S. Supreme Court has yet
to decide the constitutionality of such
provisions. Jln Hayes v. Florida, 66
however, the Court noted that it had
"not abandon[ed] the suggestion in
Davis . . . that under circumscribed
procedures, the Fourth _A_rnendment
rnjght permit the judiciary to autho
rize the seizure of a person on less
than probable cause and his removal

Grand Jury Subpoenas
Another method by which evi
dence may be obtained from a suspect
is the grand jury. Kn United States v.
Dionisio, 72 the defendant challenged
the use of a grand jury subpoena to

obtain voice exemplars, arguing that
an appearance before a grand jury

pursuant to a subpoena was a "sei
,
zure , of the person within the mean

to the police station for the purpose
of fingerprinting.' '67 The Court also
noted that the state courts were divid
ed on this issue. Some courts have
refused to uphold the issuance of such
orders, 68 while other courts have
sanctioned their use:69 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court strongly suggest
ed that "a brief detention in the field
for the purpose of fingerprinting,''
based on reasonable spspicion, would
be constitutional. 70 0
The dictum in Davis and Haves.
however, was lii1Uted to fingetp int�
ing, which the Court emphasized was
not an intrusive procedure. The issu
ance of nontestimonial identification
orders for more intrusive procedures,
such as the extraction of blood, may
conflict with Schmerber in which the
Court required a more demanding
standard. 71

ing of the Fourth Amendment. The

Supreme Court rejected this argu
ment, holding that the "compulsion

exerted by a grand jury subpoena

differs from u'ie seizure effected by

an arrest or even an i.Jnvestigative
'stop. ' "73

The latter is abrupt, is effected

with force or the threat of it and
often in demeaning circumstances,

and, in the case of arrest, results

;

66
67

in a record involving social stigma.

A subpoena is served in the same

manner as other legal process; it

involves no stigma whatever; if the

time for appearance is inconve

nient, this can generally be altered;

and it remains at all times under
the control and supervision of a

court. 74

In short, since the Fourth Amend

470U.S. 811(1985).

ment is not implicated, requirements

Id. at 817.

such as probable cause or reasonable

6' See In re September 1981 Term
Grand Jury, 432 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ill.
App. 1982) (probable cause required for
blood and hair samples); State v. Evans,
338 N.W.2d 788, 794(Neb. l983)(prob
able cause required for fingerprints and
palmprints).

suspicion rlo not apply, Courts have

upheld the use of a grand jury subpoe
na for obtaining hai1dwritii1g exem-

order on less than probable cause in order
to take blood samples from a suspect's
person. Indeed, the constitutionality of
such a procedme appears doubtful in light
of Schmerber v. California. ) .

69 See Wise v. Murphy, 275 A. 2d 205,
213-216(D.C. 197l )(en banc)(lineups);
State v. Hall, 461 A.2d 1155, 1160
(N.J.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008
(1983).
70

''

470U.S. at 816.

72

410 U.S. 1 (1973).

73

Id. at 10.

74

Id. See also United States v. Euge,
444 U.S. 707 (1980) (Internal Revenue
Service statutorily authorized to issue
sum.i1mnses compeiiing a taxpayer to pro
vide handwriting exemplars).

People v. Marshall, 244
71 See
N.W.2d 451, 456 (Mich. App. 1976)
(' 'l'Jo judicial precedent was found, how
ever, which sanctioned the use of a court
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plars, 75 fingerprints, 76 and hair sam
ples77 as well as other evidence of
identification.78
The use of a grand jury subpoena
to obtain blood samples, however,
presents a different question. Such an
under-the-skin intrusion raises signif
icant Fourth Amendment issues. One
federal district court has ruled that a
grand jury subpoena for blood and
saliva samples must be based on rea
sonable suspicion.79 Another district
cour t disagreed, holding that the use
of a subpoena for this purpose is
improper; a warrant based upon
probable cause is required. Ac
cording to this court, ''[t]o allow the
United States to use a Rule 17(c)
subpoena for this purpose would ab
rogate T.S.'s Fourth Amendment
rights and, thus, transform the sub
poena into an instrument by which an
illegal search and seizure is effectu
0
ated. ''8
Several state courts have also
addressed this issue. After holding
that the state constitution provides
greater protection than its federal

counterpart, the lllinois Supreme
court examined a subpoena that re
quired blood, head and pubic hair,
and fmger and palm prints. The Court
ruled that ''some showing of individ
ualized suspicion as well as relevance
must be made before physical evi
dence of a noninvasive nature, such
as an in-person appearance in a lineup
or fmgerprinting, is demanded of a
witness. This may be done through an
affidavit by the State's Attorney." 81

Pubic hair samples, however, are dif
ferent. They come from ''the most
private part of the human body'' and
''represent a considerable intrusion
into personal privacy.''82 According
ly, probable cause and a warrant are
required. Head hairs also raise priva
cy concerns. While the color and tex
ture of the hair is readily observable,
an ''individual does not ordinarily
have the expectation that others will
cut, pull or comb his hair without his
permission. "83 Thus, the probable
cause requirement similarly applies
here.
In addition, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals has held as a
matter of state law that a grand jury
subpoena for blood samples requires
probable cause and a subpoena for
fmger and palm prints requires a rea
sonable and individualized suspi
cion.84

15 E.g. , United States v. Mara, 4 1 0
U. S. 19,2 1 -22 (1973) ; United States v.
Rich ardson, 755F.2d 685,68 5-686 (8th
Cir. 1985) .
7 6 E.g. ,In r e Grand Jury Proceed ings
(Schofield) , 507F.2d 963 ,96 7 (3d Cir.) ,
cen. denied, 42 1 U.S. 1 0 1 5 (1975) . See
alsoIn re Melvin,550 F.2d 6 74,677 (1 st
Cir. 1 9 77) .

Search and Seizure ofPhysical
Evidence

77 E. g. ,In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Mills) , 686 F .2d 1 3 5, 1 39 (3d Cir.) ,
cert. denied, 4 59 U. S. 1020 (1982).

Even if a suspect's detention is
constitutionally
permissible,
the
question remains whether the search
and seizure of evidence from that

78 E. g. , United States v. Ferri, 778
F.2d 985,995-996 (3d Cir. 1985) (shoe
and foot prints) , cen. denied, 416 U. S.
1 1 72 (1986) ; In re Grand Jury Proceed 
ings (Hellman) , 756 F.2d 428, 431 (6th
Cir. 1985) (voice exemplar) .

8 1 In re May 1 99 1 Will County Grand
Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 93 5-936 (TIL
1992) .

Henry v. R yan, 775 F. Supp. 247
(N.D. TIL 1 99 1 ) .
79

80 In

2
8

ld.

83

ld. at 938.

Woolverton v. Multicounty Grand
Jury, 8 59 P.2d 1 1 1 2 (Okla. Crim. App.
1993).
84

re Grand Jury Proceedings
(T. S.) , 816 F. Supp. 1 196, 1 205 (W.D.
Ky. 1 993).
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zme" within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court con
sidered whether the taking of a voice
exemplar itself constituted a search:

person is also permissible. The initial
inquiry is whether l:here is, i.I(')fact,
a search within the meat11ing of the
Fourth Amendment. If there is a
''search,'' the next question is wheth
er the search complies with Fourth
Amendment constraints, such as tl1e
warrant and probable cause require
ments. 85

The physical cha:racteristics of a
person's voice, its tone and man
ner, as opposed to t.�e content of a
specific conversation, are con
stantly exposed to the-public. Like
a man's facial characteristics, or
handwriting, his voice is repeat

Physical Characteristics
The leading case defming which
activities
are
governmental

edly produced for others to hear.
No person can have a reasonable

''searches'' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment is Katz v. United
States. 86 Katz substituted a privacy
approach for the traditional property

expectation that others wil! not
lmow the sound of his voice, any
more than he can reasonably ex
pect that his face will be a mystery
to the world. 39

approach to this issue. According to
the Court:

Accordingly, there was no search.
L11 United States v. Mara,90 the
Courl reached the same conclusion
with respect to handwriting: "Hand

'' [T]he Fourth Amendment pro
tects people, not places. V\lhat a
person lrnowi.ngly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. . . . But
what he seeks to preserve as pri
vate, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally

writing, like speech, is repeatedly
shown to the public, and ti-}ere is no
more expectation of privacy in the
physical characteristics of a person's
script than there is in the tone of his
voice. "91

protected.' '87

Invasive Procedures

The Katz rationale played a major
role in two cases that involved the
compelled production of voice and
handwriting exemplars by means of

All evidence of physical character
istics, however, is not beyond Fourth
Amendment protection. In Schmer
ber, decided before Dionisio, the
Court held that the extraction of blood
for the purpose of scientific analysis
"plainly constitute[s] searches of
'persons' "92 within the meaning of

a grand jury subpoena. In United
States v. Dionisio, 38 after ruling that
the compelled appearance of a person
before a grand jury was not a "sei-

the Fourth Amendment. In Dionisio,
the Court distinguished, rather than

"' If a suspect consents, neither a war
rant nor probable cause is required. How
ever, the consent must be valid. See
Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp. 264, 266
(E.D. Tex. 1969) (consent not valid
where defendant deceived as to purpose
of blood test), aff'd, 424 F.2d 524, 525
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U. S. 960
(1970).
36

389U.S. 347 (1967).

37

Id. at 351.

DB

410U.S. 1 (1973).

39

Id. at 14.

YO

410 u.s. 19 (1973).

91 Id. at 21. Accord United States v.
Euge,444U.S. 707,718 (1980) ("Com
pulsion of handwriting exemplars is nei
ther a search or seizure subject to Fourth
Amendment protections. . . . ).
"

92

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 767 (1966).
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In another case, Cupp v. Murphy, 99
th� �ourt considered the legality of
seiZmg fingernail scrapings from a
suspect.After fmding that the defen
dant had been detained on probable
cause, thtf Court stated:

overruled, Schmerber: "The re
quired disclosure of a person's voice
is thus immeasurably further re
moved from the Fourth Amendment
protection than was the intrusion into
the body effected by the blood extrac
tion in Schmerber. "39
The difference between Dion sio
and Schmerber turns on the bodily
intrusion involved in the extraction of
blood samples. In Skinner v. Railway
lAbor Executives' A s s 'n ,94 the Court
wrote that "it is obvious that this
physical intrusion, penetrating be
neath the skin, infringes an expecta
tion of privacy that society is pre

The inquiry does not end here,
however, because Murphy was
subjected to a search as well as a
seizure of his person. Unlike the
fmgerprinting in Davis, the voice
exemplar obtained in United States
v. Dionisio ..., or the handwrit
ing exemplar obtained in United
States v. Mara . . . , the search of
the respondent's fingernails went
beyond mere ''physical character
istics . . . constantly exposed to
the public.'' United States v. Dio
nisio . . ., and constituted the type
of ''severe, though brief, intrusion
upon cherished personal security' '
that is subject to constitutional
00
scrutiny. 1

pared to recognize as reasonable. "95
In addition, an ensuing chemical
analysis of the blood sample to obtain
physiological data ''is a further inva
sion" of privacy interests.% Under
this view, the analysis of breath to
determine intoxication ''implicates
similar concerns about bodily integri
ty"and thus constitutes a search.79
The Court in Skinner also consid
ered the collection of urine samples.
Even though this procedure does not
involve a bodily intrusion, the Court
held that it was a search.Like blood,
the chemical analysis of urine can
"reveal a host of private medical
facts," including whether a person
is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.
Moreover, the manner of collection,
which may involve visual or aural
monitoring of urination, "itself im
plicates privacy interests.''98

In sum, any procedure more intru
sive than the obtaining of fmger
prints, voice, or handwriting exem
plars
implicates
the
Fourth
1 1
Amendment. Taking shoe prints, 0
. .
102
examm mg teeth,
and inspecting
hands under ultraviolet light10 3 are

Amendment purposes.") , cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 1362 ( 1993).
99
100

412 U.S. 291 ( 19 73) .
ld . at 295.

101

93

See United States v. Ferri, 778
F.2d 985, 995-996 (3d Cir. 198 5) , cert.
denied, 4 76 U.S. 1172 ( 1986).

410 U.S. at 14.

94

489 u.s. 602 (1989) .

95

ld . at 6 16 .

96

ld .

102
See United States v. Holland , 3 78
F. Supp. 144 , 154 (E.D. Pa.) (dental
examination not a search), aff'd, 506
F.2d 1050 (3 d Cir. 19 74) , ce11. denied,
420 u.s. 994 ( 1975) .

ld. at 6 16 -617. See also Burnet t v.
Anchorage, 806 F:2d 1447, 1449 (9th
Cir. 1986) ("[T]he administration of a
breath test is a search with in the meaning
of th eFourth Amendment. . . . ) .
97

103

See United States v. Kenaan, 496
F.2d 181, 182-183 ( 1st Cir. 19 74) ; but
see People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792 ,
79 5 (Colo.) ( ultraviolet inspection of
h and s a search), cert. denied, 4 79 U. S.
965 ( 1986).

"

98 489 U.S. at 617. See alsoForbes v.
Trigg, 9 76 F.2d 308, 3 12 ( 7th Cir. 1992)
( "Urine tests are search es for Fourth
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not considered searches. In contrast,
taking hair samples generally has
been characterized as a search. 104

then incarcerated in a local jail for
attempting to break into a post office.
Paint chips were found at the crime
scene. The following moriling, the
police seized the defendant's clothes.
Examination of these garments dis
closed paint chips that matched those
found at the crime scene. The Su
preme Court held that the delayed
search of the clothing was constitu
tional, notwithstanding the absence
of a warrant. According to the Court,
the established rule is that:

Searches In cident to Arrest
One of the major exceptions to
the warrant requirement is the search
incident to arrest doctrine. 105 In Cupp
1
v. Murphy, 06 the Court upheld the
seizure of fmgernail sctapifigifunder
this doctrine. During the voluntary
stationhouse questioning of Murphy
about his wife's strangulation mur
der, the police observed a dark spot
on his fmger, which they believed to
be blood. Despite Murphy's protests;
fingernail scrapings were taken. The
scrapings contained traces of skill and
blood as well as fabric from the vic
tim's garments. The facts of Murphy
are somewhat unusual because the
defendant was not formally placed
under arrest at the time the scrapings
were removed. Nevertheless, the
Court assumed probable cause for an
arrest existed and held that the search
incident to arrest justified the "very
limited search necessary to preserve
the highly evanescent evidence they
' 1 7
found under his fmgernails. ' 0
1 8
In United States v. Edwards, 0 the
defendant was arrested at night and

·

[O]nce the accused is lawfully ar
restd and is in custody, the effects
in his possession at the place of
detention that were subject to
search at the time and place of his
arrest may lawfully be searched
and seized without a warrant even
though a substantial period of time
has elapsed between the arrest and
subsequent administrative pro
cessing, on the one hand, and the
taking of the property for qse as
evidence, on the other. This is true
where the clothing or effects are
immediately seized upon arrival at
the jail, held under the defen<jant's
name in the "property room" 'of
the jail, and at a later time searched
and taken for use at the subsequent
criminal trial. The result is the
same where the property is not
physically taken from the defen
dant until sometime after his incar
ceration. 109

104 E.g. , Bouse v. Bussey, 573 F.2d
548, 550 (9th Cir. 19 77) ; In re May 199 1
Will County Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d
929,93 5-938 ( Ill. 1992) ( both pubic and
h ead h air protected by state constitution) .
But see In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Mills) , 686 F.2d 13 5, 139 (3d Cir. )
( seizure of facial and h ead h air not a
search) , cert. denied, 4 59 U.S. 1020
( 1982) .

The seizure of gunshot
111
1
bomb
due, 1 0 fingerprints,
109

107
108

Id. at 80 7-808.

110

See State v. Ulrich, 609 P.2d 12 18 ,
122 1 (Mont. 1980) .

105
Und er this exception, once a sus
pect h as been arrested based on probable
cause, a search of the arrestee's person
and th e area within h is immediate control
is permitted . Ch ime} v. California, 3 95
u.s. 752 ( 1969) .
l(lo

resi
resi-

111
See Napolitano v. United States,
340 F.2d 3 13 , 3 14 (1st Cir. 196 5) ; Com
monwealth v. Young, 572 A.2d 1217,
1224 ( Pa. 1990) . The obtaining of finger
prints, h owever, is probably not a search
within th e meaning of Fourth Amend 
ment because a person d oes not h ave a
reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to fingerprints.

412 u.s. 291 (1973) .
Id . at 296.
415 u.s. 800 ( 19 74) .
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due , 1 1 2 hair, 1 13 and urine1 14 as well as
other types of physical evidence1 15
have been upheld as incident to a
lawful arrest. Here, again, the Su
preme Court has shown a greater
concern for searches involving bodily
intrusions than for other types of
searches. For example, in Schmer
ber, the Court rejected the notion that
the extraction ofblood is automatical
ly encompassed by the search inci
dent to arrest doctrine. According to

desired evidence might be ob
tained. In the absence of a clear
indication that in fact such evi
dence will be found, these funda
mental human interests require law
officers to suffer the risk that such
. evidence may disappear unless
there is an immediate search . 1 1 6
The Court further considered the
necessity of securing a warrant based
on probable cause as a prerequisite to
the extraction of blood. It found the
purpose underlying the warrant re
quirement-the intervention of a neu
tral detached magistrate between the
police and the citizen-applicable to
bodily intrusions: " The importance
of the informed, detached and delib
erate determinations of the issue
whether or not to invade another 's
body in search of evidence of guilt is
indisputable and great. " 1 17 Neverthe
less, because the alcohol content of
blood diminishes with the passage of
time, the Court recognized an "emer
gency" exception to the warrant re
quirement that was necessary to pre
clude the destruction of evidence.
The emergency exception recog
nized in Schmerber, however , would
not apply in other contexts-for ex
ample, when blood is sought for the
purpose of typing or DNA profiling ,
which involve genetic characteristics
that remain constant. 1 1 8

the Court, the justifications underly
ing that rule
have little applicability with re
spect to searches involving intru
sions beyond the body's surface.
The interests in h uman dignity and
privacy which the Fourth Amend
ment protects forbid any such in
trusions on the mere chance that
112
See Unit ed St ates v. Bridges, 499
F.2d 179, 180 (7th Cir.) (swabbing of
h ands for bomb resid ue) , cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1010 (1974) ; Unit ed St at es v.
Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 183 (1st Cir.
19 74) (ultraviolet ins pecti on of hands for
bomb res id ue) .
113
See United States v. Weir, 657
F.2d 1005, 1007 (8th Cir. 1981) ; Unit ed
States v. D'Am ic o, 408 F.2d 33 1, 333
(2d Cir. 1969) (clipping ofh ead h air of an
in-c ust ody d efendant not unreasonable) .
But s ee Bouse v. Bussey , 573 F.2d 548 ,
550 (9th Cir. 19 77) (warrant required for
removal of h air) ; St ate v. Gammill, 58 5
P.2d 10 74,10 77-10 78 (Kan. App. 19 78)
(pluck ing of pubic h air c onst itut ed a bodi
ly intrusion requiring a warrant) .

Surgical Procedures
The most intrusive procedures that
have been challenged on Fourth
Amendment grounds involve the sur
gical removal ofbullets from suspects

1 14· See E wing v. Stat e, 3 10 N.E.2d
571, 578 (Ind. App. 1974) (en bane) . But
s ee People v. Williams , 557 P.2d 399,
406 (Colo. 19 76) (Schmerber 's "clear
indic at ion'' standard required for urine
s ample) .

116

Sch merber v. Californi a, 384 U.S.
757, 769- 770 (1966) (emph asis added) .
117

Id. at 770.

118

115

E. g., Burnett v. Anchorage, 806
F .2d 144 7, 14 50 (9th Cir. 1986) (breath 
alyzer examination) ; Unit ed Stat es v.
Smith, 4 70 F.2d 3 77, 3 79 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (benz idine swabbings of penis for
blood) .

See Graves v. Beto, 301 F. Supp.
264, 265 (E .D. Tex. 1969), aff d 424
F.2d 524 (5th Cir.) , cen. denied, 400
U.S. 960 (19 70) ; Mills v. Stat e,345 A.2d
12 7, 132 (Md . App. 1975), aff'd, 363
A.2d 491 (Md . 19 76) .
'

1 75
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for the purpose of firearms identifica
tion. The Supreme Court considered
this issue in Winston v. Lee. 1 1 9 Ac
cording to the Court:

Second, the Court found that the
prosecution's need for the evidence
was not compelling. There was sub
stantial additional evidence that could

The reasonableness of surgical in
trusions beneath the skin depends
on a case-by-case approach, L'l
which the individua l ' s interests in
privacy and security are weigbed
against society ' s interests in con
ducting the procedure. fu a given
case, the question whether the
community 's need for evidence
outweighs the substantial privacy
interests at stake is a delicate one
admitting of few categorical an
swers . 120

be introduced to establish the defen
26
dant's guilt; 1 the victim made a posi
tive and spontaneous identification of
the accused, and the accused had been
found with a bullet wound near the
crime scene soon after its commis
sion .
The Court mentioned, but did not
rely, on two other factors . First, be
cause the accused had been provided
with a fuli adversary hearing and ap
pellate review, ihe Court declined
to consider whether. less protective
safeguards were constitutionally ac

The Court relied principally on two
factors to determine that surgery
would be unconstitutional in Win
ston. First, the Court referred to the
risk to the defendant' s health as a
"crucial factor . " 1 2 1 For example, "a
search for evidence of a criille may
be unjustifiable if it endangers t.h.e
122
The
life or health of the suspect. ' '
Court later noted that the record
showed uncertainty about the medical
risks involved. 1 23 Other cases have
2
permitted minor surgery, 1 4 while
precluding more serious medical pro
1 5
cedures. 2
119
120
121

ceptable. 127 Second , the Court noted
that some question had been raised
about the probative value of the evi
dence because the bullet' s markings
may have corroded . The Court, how
ever, stated that it had given little
\:Veight to t1]is factor oYving to t"'le
absence of lower court findings on
the issue . 128 A Florida court has held
surgery ureasonable because the pro
bative value of the evidence remained
doubtful owing to the possible alter
ation of the bullet's rifling striations
· by the chemical effect of bodily fluids
over a four-year period. 129

470U.S. 753 (1985).

LTJ one case in which surgical re
moval was upheld , 130 the retrieved

Id. at 760.
Id. at 761 .

"' Id.
12 3

spinal canal); People v. Smith , 362
N . Y. S . 2d 909(Sup. Ct. 1 974).

Id. at 763-764.

126

124 E
. g. , Johnson v. State, 521 So.
2d 1006, 1 01 4-1015 (Ala. Crirn. App.
1986), aff'd, 521 So. 2d 1018 (Ala. ),
cert. denied, 488 U. S. 876 (1988); State
v. l\1artin, 404 So. 2d 96D, 962-963 (La.
198 1 ); Hughes v. State, 466 A . 2d 533 ,
5 3 6 (Md. App.), cert. denied, 4 7 0 A . 2d
353 (Md. 1 983); Andrews v. Love, 763
P. 2d 7 1 4 (Olda. Crim. App. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1082 (1989); State v.
Allen, 291 S. E . 2d 459, 463 (S. C. 1 982).

127

470 U.S. at 766-767.

Id. at 763 n. 6. See State v.
Overstreet, 551 S.W. 2d 621, 628 (Mo.
1977) (en bane) (minor surgery unconsti
tutional in absence of court approval ).
128

470 U. S. at 766 n. lO.

1 29

Doe v. State, 409 So. 2d 25, 27
(Fla. App. 1981), review denied, 418 So.
2d 1 28 0 (Fla. 1982).
13°
Creamer v. State, 205 S. E . 2d 240
(Ga. 1 972), cert. dismissed, 4 1 0 tL S .
975 (1 973).

125

E . g. , Bowden v. State, 510 S. W. 2d
879 (Ark. 1974) (removal of bullet from
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bullet did not match the suspect
firearm. 1 31

and "can cause great human loss be
fore any signs of impairment be
comes noticeable to supervisors or
others . " 134
In a companion case, National
Treasury Em ployees Union v. Von
Raab, 135 the Court upheld an employ
ee drug testing program, which in
cluded urinalysis, for federal customs
officials who were transferred or pro
moted to positions involving the in
terdiction of illegal drugs or who
were required to carry a firearm.
Note that under both Skinner and Von
Raab, neither probable cause, rea
sonable suspicion, nor a warrant is
required. These cases, however, do
not sanction all governmentally spon
sored drug-testing procedures .

Administrative Searches
The Supreme Court first consid
ered the constitutionality of drug test
ing procedures in a pail: of 1989
cases. Both cases involved regulatory
or administrative searches. Unlike
law enforcement searches, such pro
cedures are intended to achieve gov
ernmental objectives other than the
detection or prosecution of crime.
Drug Testing
In Skinner v. Railwa y Labor Exec
utives ' Ass 'n, 132 the Court considered
regulations issued by the Federal
Railway Administration. The regula
tions mandated blood and urine tests
for railroad employees who are in
volved in major accidents and permit
ted testing for employees who violate
safety rules. The Court rejected the
contention that permissive inspec
tions by private railroads, which were
authorized by the regulations, were
private searches outside the purview
of the Fourth Amendment . 133 More
over, blood, breath, and urine collec
tion . and testing procedures were
searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
The Court also found, however,
that the toxicological testing proce
dures were reasonable. The Court
balanced the need for the search
against the invasion of privacy in
volved, concluding that railroad em
ployees "discharge duties fraught
with . . . risks of injury to others"

DNA Data Bank Testing
A number of jurisdictions have en
acted statutes that require blood sam
ples for persons convicted of crimes,
or a specific category of crime, such
as violent crimes or sex offenses.
These provisions have been chal
lenged
on
Fourth
Amendment
grounds. In State v. Olivas, 136 the
Washington Supreme Court rejected
a search and seizure challenge to a
DNA identification sex offender law.
According to the Court, this provi
sion constituted a valid regulatory
search under Skinner. In Jones v.
Murray, 137 the Fourth Circuit reached
the same result but under a different
Fourth Amendment analysis-the di
minished privacy rights of convicted
persons.
Due Process
The seizure of evidence for scien
tific analysis also has been challenged

131

Emmett v. Ricketts ( Creamer) , 397
F. Supp. 1025, 1 033 n. 14 (N.D. Ga.
1975).
132

489 u.s. 602 (1989) .

134

133

135

ld . at 6 1 5-6 16 (The regulati ons
"are clear ind ices of th e Government's
encouragement, endorsement, and par
ti cipat ion, aiid suffi ce to implicate th e
Fo urth Amendment. " ) .

136

ld. at 628.
489 U.S. 656 ( 1 989) .
856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993).

137
962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. ) , cert.
denied, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 472 (1992).
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the Court in Schmerber, the manner

on due process grounds in several
cases. In Rochin v. California, 138 de
cided in 1 952, the Supreme Court
held that the forcible stomach pump
ing of a suspect to recover narcotic
pills "shocks the conscience " and
does not comport with traditional
ideas of fair play and decency, 139
thereby violating due process .
The Court distinguished Roclzin in
1 0
a later case, Breithaupt v. Abram, 4
in which the Court upheld the com
pelled extraction of blood . In distin
guishing the extraction of stomach
contents from the extraction of
blood,the Court emphasized that the

in which evidence is obtained from a

suspect is subject to the reasonable
ness clause of the Fourth Amend

ment. 144 This requirement would
seem to encompass virtually all cases

that are vulnerable to .attack on due

process grounds. 145

ConClusion
As the use of scientific evidence

increases, the issues surrounding the
seizing of evidence for forensic anal

ysis will grow in importance. The

DNA cases offer a cogent example.

While the U . S . Supreme Court has

latter procedme, ' 'under the protec
tive eye of a physician , ' ' was a rou
tine and scientifically accurate meth
od and therefore did not involve the
"brutality " and "offensiveness"
present in Rochin: 141 This ruling was
reaffrrmed in Schm.erber.
Rochin and Breithaupt predated
the applicability of the Bill of Rights
to the states L;rough the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amend
ment, 1 42 and thus t.�Je continued validi
ty of an independent due process anal
ysis is questionable. Such issues no
longer need be addressed in terms of
due process but rather as possible
violations of specific constitutional
guarantees enumerated in the Bill of
Rights. 143 For example, according to
133

342 U.S. 165 (1952).

139

Id. at 172-173.

1"0
1'11

addressed many of these issues, oth
ers remain unresolved. Moreover,
the failure of more states to adopt
nontestimonial procedures seems in

explicable.

cases. See Yanez v. Romero, 619 F. 2d
851, 854 (l Oth Cir. ) ("We do not say
that the Supreme Court' s decision in
Rocizin has eroded, but we do say that it
has been applied in a positive way quite
infrequently. " ), ce11. denied, 449 U . S.
876 (1980).
144 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 771 (1966).
145 See People v. Bracamonte, 540
P. 2d 624, 631 (Cal. 1975) (en bane)
(forced ingestion of emetic solution vio
lated Fourth Amendment); State v.
Strong, 493 N. W. 2d 834, 836 (Iowa
1992) (Fourth Amendment, rather than
Rochin, applied to stomach-pumping for
crack cocaine).
But see Yanez v. Romero, 619 F.2d
851, 853 (1Oth Cir. ) (Rochin due process
' 'prohibition . . . is somewhat broader
than the limitation provided by the Fourth
f\_mendment . ) , cert. denied, 449 U.S.
876 ( 1980).

352U.S. 432 (1957).
Id. at 435.

42
1
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).

1 43 This may explain why Rochin has
not played a major role in subsequent

"
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